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THE INVENTION OF THE MODEL MINORITY

Ellen D. Wu

The metamorphosis of Asians in American society from "yellow perils" to "model minorities" in the mid-twentieth century stands as one of the most arresting racial makeovers in U.S. history. To contemporaries, the rapid evolution from despised Orientals to the country's most exceptional and beloved people of color was so breathtaking that it was literally front-page news: the *New York Times* (1970) declared ethnic Japanese and Chinese "an American success story," having witnessed "the almost total disappearance of discrimination." Remarkably, their "assimilation into the mainstream of American life" was a situation that would have been "unthinkable twenty years ago."[1] How did this happen? And what were the consequences of this transformation—if more image than reality—not only for Asian Americans but also for the nation as a whole?

For more than a generation, Asian American Studies scholars have erroneously located the origins of the "model minority myth" in a pair of magazine articles published in 1966: William Petersen's "Success Story, Japanese American Style" (*New York Times Magazine*) and "Success Story of One Minority Group in U.S." (*US News and World Report*).[2] The conventional account stresses that white conservatives concocted the model minority concept to neutralize Civil Rights/Black Power activists' calls for the fundamental redistribution of wealth and power in American society.

The "model minority myth" was undoubtedly a salient and powerful form of anti-black racism espoused by mainline media in the throes of the racial upheavals of the 1960s. But this explanation is incomplete on number of levels. First, the model minority's beginnings date back to World War II. Second, liberals—not conservatives—were its instigators. Third, the model minority had its roots in the United States' push for global power as much as the African American freedom movement. And fourth, the focus on the mainstream press obscures the crucial role of Asian Americans in representing themselves as model minorities. It is impossible to comprehend the birth of the model minority without paying attention to these indispensable factors.

The model minority, in short, did not appear suddenly in 1966 in the pages of the *New York Times Magazine* and *US News and World Report*. It arose within a much longer and broader historical context.[3] The stereotype's invention was the unanticipated outcome of a series of intersecting political, social, and cultural imperatives—both domestic and international—that drove the pronounced reconfiguration of America's racial order between World War II and the Vietnam era.

Since the mid-twentieth century, white Americans had deemed so-called "Orientals" *definitively not-white*, unassimilable aliens unfit for membership in the nation. They had systematically shut out "Asiatic" persons from all types of civic participation through such measures as bars to naturalization and the franchise, occupational discrimination, residential and school segregation, anti-miscegenation legislation and customs, lynching, and terrorism. Popular representations of "Orientals" as rat-eating, opium smoking, sexually depraved, untrustworthy sub-humans provided the racial logic that justified Exclusion. Asian Americans tried mightily to reverse their degradation by claiming cultural compatibility with middle-class Anglo-Saxon Protestants. But they were unsuccessful until World War II.

Asian Americans' luck changed when the United States took up arms against the Axis powers. As the nation fought in the name of democracy against Nazis and fascists—and, soon thereafter, the Communist Soviets and Chinese—blatant white supremacy became a diplomatic liability. Such hypocrisy endangered the country's ambitions to become a geopolitical powerhouse. The United States could not claim to be the leader of the free world without attending to its race problems at home. So Americans had a strong incentive and convincing reason to reconsider the social standing of ethnic Asians in their midst. Given these circumstances, liberals moved to undo the regime of Asian Exclusion—the legal framework and web of social practices (akin to Jim Crow in the South) that had relegated Asians outside the boundaries of the national community.[4]

Yet dismantling Asian Exclusion also posed a problem for the nation. Under the old system, the status of Asian immigrants and their descendants was very clear: they were permanent foreigners with no hope of equality with whites. But when the global exigencies of the 1940s and 1950s rendered Exclusion indefensible, Asian Americans' social standing was no longer certain. The terms of their *inclusion* into the nation needed to be determined. A host of stakeholders—including some Asian Americans themselves—resolved this dilemma by the mid-1960s by coining a new image and position for Asians in the national racial order. Together, they christened Asian Americans the "model minority"— a racial group distinct from the white majority but lauded as well-assimilated, upwardly mobile, politically nonthreatening, and *definitively not-black*.

Taking this bigger picture into account in tracing the origins of the model minority myth yields big payoffs for Asian American Studies and kindred fields. It allows for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of Asian American and U.S. history more generally in the decades after World War II by illuminating the lasting impacts of international affairs on domestic racial change, and vice versa. U.S. engagement in the Asia/Pacific region was a critical engine of the making of the model minority. Asian Americans' fortunes were tied directly to the national identity politics of World War II and the Cold War. Very importantly, liberal whites moved to assimilate—rather than marginalize—ethnic Asians *because* of their putative foreignness.[5] They did so in order to help legitimate the global expansion of U.S. power, arguing that treating Asians more kindly at home would strengthen America's ties abroad.[6] For Asian Americans, becoming *assimilating Others* (persons acknowledged as capable of acting like white Americans while remaining racially distinct from them) in turn was a key stepping stone to emerging as definitively not-black model minorities.

The broader historical context also highlights the ways in which mid-twentieth-century race making (the work of creating racial categories, living within them, altering them, and even obliterating them[7]) was very much a relational process. What it meant to be Asian American or the model minority was profoundly shaped by understandings of blackness and whiteness in this period. At the same time, the era's definitions of blackness and whiteness cannot be fully grasped without taking Asian Americans into account.

Yet other interdependencies also mattered. The invention of the model minority reveals that those came to the fore at various moments, including internal divisions *within* ethnic groups ("loyal" vs "disloyal" Japanese Americans, Communist vs anti-Communist Chinese Americans), assumptions about Mexican American zoot suiters in the early 1940s, and contrasts between Native Hawaiians, haole (whites), and Asians in postwar Hawai'i. The fashioning of Asians into model minorities in the post-Exclusion decades, therefore, happened through a constellation of historically contingent comparisons with "other" Asians, African Americans, whites, Latinos, and indigenous peoples.[8]

Critically, Asian Americans were at the very heart of the process of becoming the model minority, even if the outcome was largely an unintended one. The significance of this cannot be stressed enough. In some ways, it has served the purposes of Asian American Studies to downplay the role of Asian Americans in creating the model minority myth. Acknowledging that history would seem to undercut the very important project of interracial solidarity among peoples of color, but admitting to Asian American complicity in maintaining the denigration of blackness that anchors model minority ideology is more analytically and ethically honest. Moreover, uncovering this involvement actually *helps* to overthrow the tyranny of the model minority by highlighting the *political* diversity of Asian America, past and present. If one of the thorniest problems with the model minority is that it flattens variations among those thrown together under the rubric, a history that zooms in on the various strategies and actions Asian Americans took to deal with racism in American life actually "unflattens" those differences. Rather, Asian Americans have not only worked to create the model minority stereotype but have also been at the forefront of laboring to destroy it in the decades since its inception.

Assimilating Others: Japanese America

Global conflicts profoundly altered the social standing of Japanese and Chinese Americans, the two largest ethnic-Asian populations and the ones that figured most prominently in the public eye at midcentury. World War II, the Cold War, and the Korean War framed the concurrent evolution of both from despicable strangers to "American success stories."

Divergences between U.S.–Japan and U.S.–China relations in the 1940s and 1950s resulted in major differences in their respective trajectories. For ethnic Japanese, the Pacific War between the United States and Japan led not only to their imprisonment by the federal government, but also their reconfiguration as loyal, patriotic Americans as proven by their military heroism. This, in turn, became the basis for the standard assessment that Japanese Americans were distinct from—and superior to—African Americans, a view that coalesced by the mid-1960s. In contrast, representations of ethnic Chinese as unlike *and* better than blacks emphasized anti-communism, good behavior, and family values.

But a key parallel laid the groundwork for the simultaneous emergence of Japanese and Chinese Americans as definitively not-black model minorities after World War II. This was the political philosophy known as racial liberalism, the growing belief that the country's racial diversity could best be managed by assimilating and integrating minorities into the white middle class. Beginning in the 1940s, liberal political leaders and intellectuals endorsed the use of state intervention to orchestrate the social engineering necessary to achieve civil rights and equality of citizenship for nonwhites.[9]

Japanese American internment (1942–1945) was without question the very nadir of Asian Exclusion. The federal government's incarceration of some 120,000 Nikkei as an (unproven) fifth column for Japan entailed a spectacular denial of civil liberties. In authorizing, executing,

and defending the constitutionality of mass imprisonment, the state effectively classified each and every Nikkei (ethnic Japanese) in the United States as "enemy aliens."[10]

Yet internment also marked the beginnings of Asian *inclusion* by serving as the vehicle through which Japanese Americans were recast into assimilating Others. Liberals—including the officials of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the federal agency charged with operating the camps—saw in internment an opportunity and a necessity to assimilate Japanese Americans into the mainstream. To the WRA's administrators, it also presented an unparalleled promise for refashioning ethnic Japanese into model American citizens via state-engineered cultural and structural assimilation. Internee life was designed with this goal in mind. Camp schools curricula, for instance, prioritized English language instruction and the inculcation of American values, while camp "community councils" trained inmates in the arts of domestic governance.[11]

The WRA also laid out two pipelines to re-entry into American life and fortifying Nikkeis' station in the national polity. The first of these was postinternment migration throughout the United States, or "resettlement." For state authorities, resettlement seemed the perfect test case for racial liberalism's incipient solution to America's race problems. The federal government planned to scatter Japanese Americans around the country so that they might disappear into the white middle class instead of returning to their West Coast farms and Little Tokyos. The WRA unambiguously stressed total assimilation to potential resettlers. Prisoners who wanted to leave the camps had to promise federal officials that they would only speak English in public, avoid associating with large groups of Nikkei, and conform to polite standards of decorum. (The last point was particularly aimed at Nisei zoot suiters whose conspicuous comportment—suggesting an explicit kinship with Mexican Americans and African Americans—especially troubled resettlement coordinators.)[12]

The results of resettlement were mixed. Internees greeted the plans with tepid enthusiasm. In all, only 36,000 prisoners—less than one third of the total number—took part in the resettlement program before the end of the war, starting anew in locations throughout the Midwest, the Atlantic seaboard, and the mountain states. Many of them tested the WRA's rigid vision of ethnic dispersal right away. Some did comply strictly with the WRA's guidelines. But others took a more realistic approach. In Chicago, the most popular destination for resettlers, lonely Nisei (second-generation Japanese) readily sought each other out for companionship, preferring the easy company of other Japanese Americans over the challenges of cultivating relationships outside the ethnic group. Racial discrimination in the city also intensified this uneasiness. Resettlers soon learned that their Japanese ancestry remained a barrier to securing desirable housing, employment, and access to public spaces such as dance halls, hospitals, and even cemeteries.[13]

Living an indeterminate present and looking toward an unknown future, countless resettlers readily dismissed the WRA's instructions to act as respectable "ambassadors" to mainstream America. Many quit their jobs unannounced, seeking better work and higher pay, to the chagrin of federal authorities who feared that such habits "reflected unfavorably" on all Japanese Americans.[14]

Eventually, the WRA conceded that assimilation would take time, given the traumatic experiences of incarceration. Federal authorities even endorsed the formation of ethnic specific organizations to support former internees through the process of readjustment. The reconstitution of Japanese American communities in the postwar period, then, can be understood as a defiance of the government's assimilationist race policy—quite the opposite of what "model minorities" were supposed to do.[15]

In tandem with resettlement, the WRA promoted military service as the route to mainstream recognition and acceptance. To federal authorities, taking up arms seemed an especially

foolproof way for internees to prove their unswerving loyalty to the nation—not to mention a visible means to counter Japan's propaganda that the United States was fighting a "race war." Certain Japanese American spokespersons pushed strongly for enlistment, especially the Nisei leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). And despite vocal protests from within the camps—including bitter denunciations of the proposed "Jap Crow" (segregated) regiments—the Army went ahead as planned.[16]

The scheme was stunningly effective. "GI Joe Nisei" became the face of an extensive and persuasive public relations campaign conducted in tandem by the state and JACL. Countless media outlets circulated stories of heroic Japanese Americans on the battlefield. *Reader's Digest*, for one, applauded the myriad ways in which Nisei soldiers fought not only to win the way but also "to prove that Japanese-Americans were basically no different in attitude or loyalty from American citizens whose forebears came from other lands."[17]

In the postwar period JACL heads continued extolling the Japanese American troops for two purposes. First, they wished to redeem their damaged reputation *within* the ethnic community for their controversial support for drafting Nisei. Second, they hoped to convince lawmakers to undo the remaining pillars of Exclusion by lobbying for Japanese American *inclusion* as the reward for the Niseis' undeniable sacrifices.[18]

The pinnacle of their PR efforts was *Go for Broke!* (1951), the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer feature film that chronicled the valor of the famed 442nd all-Nisei battalion on the European front. (JACL officer Mike Masaoka served as "special consultant" during production.) The moral of the tale was that Japanese Americans had proved beyond a doubt their Americanism through their "baptism of blood." The movie opened with great fanfare in Washington DC, Honolulu, Los Angeles, and Tokyo. Cincinnati even declared a "Go for Broke" week honoring the city's Nisei veterans in May.[19]

Stories of Nisei in uniform fueled the momentum in favor of overturning Japanese Exclusion. Journalists and politicians followed JACL's lead, arguing that naturalization and immigration rights were due to the community as thanks for their tours of duty. Against the backdrop of the Korean conflict and the Cold War, they also convincingly added that such gestures would strengthen ties between the U.S. and Japan, America's "bulwark of democracy in the Orient." In 1952, Congress passed the McCarran–Walter Act, finally allowing ethnic Japanese to become naturalized citizens and the resumption of immigration from Japan.[20]

Nevertheless, JACL's Nisei soldier campaign had many detractors. During the war, draft resisters had refused to serve and those known as renunciants had renounced their U.S. citizenship. In the years after the conflict, some Japanese Americans continued to denounce the league for promoting what they saw as a highly problematic representation of their community, its "Uncle Tom" accommodationism, and its claims to speak for all Japanese Americans.[21]

In the 1950s, then, the JACL remained on shaky footing within the ethnic community that it purported to represent. Even its highest legislative victory—the 1952 McCarran–Walter Act—drew ire from co-ethnic critics. The law's reactionary provisions allotted more power to the federal government to exclude, deport, and denaturalize Communists. It restricted immigration numbers from colonies (especially those in the British Caribbean), a move read by many as anti-black. Additionally, it did nothing to rid the books of race-based national entry quotas. The leftist Nisei Progressives, the most visible alternative to the JACL, had lobbied President Harry S. Truman to veto the bill. After its passage, University of Chicago linguist S.I. Hayakawa criticized the League for securing Issei naturalization rights "at the cost of questionable and illiberal" policies, a compromise that was "an act of unpardonable short-sightedness of cynical opportunism."[22]

Faultfinders of JACL, however, could do little to dislodge the now-dominant image of the Nisei soldier. He had become the basis of a new popular idea of Japanese Americans as politically moderate, patriotic Americans. This, in turn, became a crucial foundation for the model minority stereotype in the following decade.

Assimilating Others: Chinese America

As with Japanese Americans, racial liberalism and U.S. foreign relations structured the experiences of Chinese Americans during and after World War II. With the United States battling against the Axis powers in the name of democracy, many liberals felt that Chinese Exclusion risked America's trans-pacific alliance with China against Japan. As one federal official brooded, severe immigration restrictions made for "bad diplomacy" at a time when China stood as "the only possibility of an allied offensive on the Asiatic continent."[23]

A coast-to-coast campaign emerged to strike down the laws. In addition to harping on the foreign policy stakes of the issue, strategists sought to reshape the imagery of Chinese in U.S. popular thinking. The Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion recognized that it would have to neutralize deep-seated fears of "yellow peril" coolie hordes. So it purposefully recast Chinese in its promotional materials and congressional testimonies as "law-abiding, peace-loving, courteous people living quietly among us." Fortuitously, this project resonated with the state's emphasis on racial tolerance and cultural diversity to foster national unity for the purposes of war mobilization. The outreach worked exceedingly well. National, regional, and niche newspapers and magazines opined in favor of the crusade. Mass-market periodicals featured celebratory profiles of patriotic, respectable Chinese American citizens through the war's duration.[24]

Chinese Americans' prospects thus changed decidedly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor as *inclusion* became the defining paradigm of their social standing. Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1943. As a result, persons of Chinese ancestry were permitted to naturalized U.S. citizenship, while the legal immigration of Chinese resumed in small numbers—a symbolic elevation to equality with European immigrants. Opportunities also took place in more bread-and-butter forms. African Americans' "Double V" campaign for victory over fascism abroad and racism at home especially helped to open to Chinese Americans previously restricted avenues for socio-economic advancement in industry and the armed forces. The progressive activist-writer Carey McWilliams dramatically captured liberals' optimism in this moment: "The war has brought the Chinese out of Chinatown and we should lock the doors behind them." Chinese Americans themselves were thrilled: "The crisis of December 7 has emancipated the Chinese in the United States," proclaimed sociologist Rose Hum Lee.[25]

Yet even with this radical shift in U.S. attitudes, most whites never dissociated Chinese Americans from notions of foreignness. Chinese Americans remained tethered to China in the public's imagination—shaky grounds for acceptance and full citizenship given the victory of the Mao Zedong's Communist Party in China's civil war. While Chinese Americans did not break free of this linkage, the simultaneous existence of a "bad" China (the People's Republic, or PRC) and a "good" one (the Nationalists on Taiwan) after 1949 meant that they could position themselves as anti-communist disaporic Chinese committed to both Nationalist ("free") China and the United States.[26]

The PRC's entry into the Korean War in October 1950 heightened the stakes of these associations. Chinese across the United States scrambled to divorce themselves from "Red" China. Conservative Chinatown leaders masterminded this strategy to protect the community from anticipated McCarthyist repression—many feared a mass incarceration analogous to the egregious

racial profiling experienced by Japanese Americans during World War II. (They also seized the occasion to crush the Chinatown left and shore up their own power within the ethnic community.) Elites launched a nationwide crusade against communism, establishing local "Anti-Communist Leagues" and planning demonstrations, parades, Korean War relief clothing drives, and other public spectacles to drive home the point that Chinese Americans were patriotic and loyal to the United States.[27]

These efforts were not entirely convincing. In 1956, federal authorities instigated a crackdown on unlawful Chinese immigration under the pretense that Communist Chinese spies were slipping into the country using false papers. The offensive—involving mass subpoenas and grand jury investigations of Chinatown organizations, prosecutions, and deportations—placed all Chinese in the United States (especially the left-leaning) under suspicion.[28]

But assumptions of foreignness had payoffs as well as constraints for Chinese America in the early Cold War years. The rise of the PRC obliged the U.S. government to pay attention to "Overseas Chinese"— members of a global Chinese diaspora with ties to each other and China—living throughout the Asia/Pacific region. The worry was that these imigrant communities were especially susceptible to political seduction by Mao's ideologies. So federal officials turned to Chinese Americans, the country's own "Overseas Chinese," to woo their assumed compatriots away from the enemy's camp.[29]

Cold War diplomacy served as a meeting ground for a convergence of state and ethnic community interests in the 1940s and 1950s. The Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) peddled narratives of successful and assimilated Chinese Americans to these target populations in order to demonstrate the superiority of liberal democracy to communism. They disseminated the stories via newspaper and magazine articles, books, art exhibitions, and films. At the suggestion of second-generation Chinese American Betty Lee Sung, the Voice of America (the federal government's international radio operation) broadcast *Chinese Activities*, a weekly segment showcasing noteworthy Chinese in the United States. The State Department also enlisted as cultural ambassadors prominent individuals whose achievements would offer "living proof" of America's friendliness to racial minorities. Jade Snow Wong and Dong Kingman, two of the most well-known artists of the day, embarked on multi-stop tours of the region, as did San Francisco's decorated Chinese Basketball Team.[30]

For their part, the Chinese Americans who took part in these programs were not motivated by anti-communism or patriotism alone, but rather by a range of reasons to participate. While they were undoubtedly familiar with the State Department's Cold War agenda, they did not necessarily hold one-dimensional views about U.S. foreign policy. For instance, Sung, who served as head scriptwriter for Chinese Activities between 1949–1954, did not consider herself to be producing anti-communist propaganda per se. Rather, she used the opportunity to counter decades of hateful and demeaning stereotypes about Chinese in the United States. Wong, Kingman, and the San Francisco basketball players gained acknowledgment and publicity for their careers. Beyond these individual benefits, the ethnic community as a whole welcomed the official legitimization of their national belonging. Indeed, the government's tapping of Chinese Americans to serve as "goodwill ambassadors" would have been inconceivable during the Exclusion era.[31]

Closer to home, liberals convincingly turned the community's association with the "good" China into social capital in the 1950s. Amidst the country's panic over juvenile delinquency, scores of journalists, scholars, and policymakers recycled the notion of the well-behaved Chinese that first surfaced during the push for repeal in the 1940s. They lauded Chinatown households for raising exceptionally dutiful, studious children. The *New York Times Magazine* (1956) emphasized that Chinese youth displayed "unquestioned obedience" toward their elders, while

Look magazine (1958) marveled that "troublemaking" among Chinatown youths was "so low that the police don't even bother to keep figures on it." U.S. Rep. Arthur Klein praised his Manhattan constituents for their "respect for parents and teachers," "stable and loving and home life," and thirst for education. Signally, in the wake of the 1956 immigration subpoena scare, savvy Chinatown public relations coordinators pushed the family values angle to shore up the community's reputation. For example, they assisted with a flattering feature on the Chinese in the United States—including their "amazingly low delinquency rate"—for *Readers' Digest*, one of the most widely read periodicals of the era.[32]

This meme gained traction because they upheld two dominant lines of Cold War-era thinking. The first was the valorization of the nuclear family. Popular portrayals of Chinese American households that attributed their orderliness to Confucian tradition resonated with contemporary conservative mores. The second was anti-communism. Observers who extolled stateside Chinese for their "venerable" Confucianism effectively drew contrasts between U.S. Chinatowns and Mao Zedong's China to suggest the superiority of the American way of life. Paralleling the ideological work of the Nisei soldier icon in the Japanese American community, the model Chinese American household of the 1950s— characterized by deference, dutifulness, and the absence of criminality—laid the foundation for explicit comparisons between Chinese as "good" minorities and African Americans as "bad" minorities in the 1960s.

Assimilating Others: The Hawai'i Statehood Debates

Hawai'i's bid for statehood occupied a pivotal place in the origins of the model minority, paralleling and reinforcing the transformations in the continental United States. The admission campaign was one of the most visible focal points for revamping the social standing of Asian Americans after World War II. Because Americans generally considered Hawai'i to be "Eastern" in orientation at this time, the statehood question effectively functioned as a national referendum on Asian American citizenship. And as with the Nisei soldier and Chinese American "non-delinquency," it helped to pave the way for the emergence of Asian Americans as definitively not-black model minorities.

Before World War II, admitting Hawai'i to the Union had been unfathomable for many Americans largely because of the islands' majority nonwhite population. Asian laborers began arriving in Hawai'i in the late nineteenth century, recruited by the haole (white) missionary-capitalist class to labor on their industrial sugar plantations. After 1898 (when the United States formally colonized Hawai'i), the haole oligarchy benefited immensely from Hawai'i's territorial status. The arrangement allowed whites to dominate the economy and local government. By contrast, statehood would democratize Hawai'i by allowing citizens to vote for public officials and other important matters. Whites feared that Nisei—who were U.S. citizens by birth and who greatly outnumbered them—would form a powerful voting bloc as they came of age. Thus the planter class perennially thwarted attempts to push forward the statehood issue. On the mainland, anti-Asian animus in popular culture and politics, coupled with increasing tensions between the United States and Japan, guaranteed that many Americans remained hostile to the possibility of sending "Japanese Senators" and "Japanese Representatives" to Congress.[33]

The Pacific War changed nearly everything. In the wake of the Pearl Harbor bombing, Hawai'i came to be seen as an integral part of the nation. Tens of thousands of mainlanders rotated through the archipelago as military and defense industry personnel, heightening the general awareness of the territory and its significance. Nikkei battlefield sacrifices eased worries about Japanese Americans' disloyalties. The wartime emphasis on celebrating cultural pluralism amplified arguments made by area liberals since the 1920s and 1930s. University of Hawaii social

scientists, in particular, had been touting the islands as a racial paradise where the Asiatic presence was harmless, if not an asset. Moreover, revised U.S. trade policies disadvantaging haole growers, coupled with the imposition of martial law on Hawai'i during the war, convinced many locals that territorial status was no longer favorable. At the close of the war, the prognosis for statehood seemed bright.[34]

Nonetheless, statehood was far from an open-and-shut case after 1945. What World War II had not upended was the ubiquitous notion that Hawai'i was "Asian." Old xenophobic allegations remained, especially that "Japs" would soon "control" the islands and infect U.S. Congress and American society with "Asiatic concepts of life" should entry be granted. Admission opponents also suggested that the islands' racial makeup made the territory susceptible to communist influence, especially the PRC. As proof, they noted that organized labor had made big inroads in Hawai'i, both in terms of unionizing and at the ballot box. Pointing to these turning tides, deniers charged that the territory had fallen under the "firm grip" of communists and should therefore be excluded from statehood.[35]

But race—like anti-communism—operated in favor of statehood as well as against it. Promoters did not disagree that Hawai'i was "Oriental." Rather, they argued these Far Eastern roots would be advantageous in the context of the Cold War and the worldwide decolonization movement. Admitting the territory would prove to the world that the United States was not racist because the act would elevate Hawai'i's ethnic Asian population to first-class citizenship. In addition, it would stand as a "concrete example of self-determination influencing all the peoples of the Pacific." Proponents depicted Hawai'i as a place of enormous ambassadorial potential, repeatedly referring to the territory as a "gateway," "springboard," "logical stepping stone," and "bridge" to Asia, among other metaphors. Statehood was a much-needed gesture to entice the newly independent Third World nations to the U.S. side of the Cold War divide. "Hawai'i's Americans of Oriental ancestry are a strong, urgent reason for Statehood, rather than the reverse," insisted territorial congressional delegate and future state governor John A. Burns.[36]

As statehood negotiations unfolded in the 1940s and 1950s, enthusiasts pitched Asian Americans as prototypical model minorities and Hawai'i as the ideal showcase for racial liberalism at work. Media outlets sang of the islands' harmonious race relations and dubbed the islands a "Pacific melting pot" and "the world's most successful experiment in mixed breeding." Sociological data confirmed that local ethnic Asian populations had Americanized (even as they maintained their Oriental essence) and were moving into the middle class. Crucially, compared to the mainland, they intermarried at astoundingly high rates with each other, Native Hawaiians, and whites. (Cognizant of the era's volatile race politics, however, statehood champions carefully reassured the public that this race-mixing was unique to Hawai'i.) All that was left to complete this picture of an idyllic multiracial liberal democracy—and thereby demonstrate to the world America's magnanimity—was the granting of formal equality (i.e. statehood).[37]

In time, such arguments proved persuasive enough to overcome lingering opposition in Congress, especially from Southern states' rights Democrats who believed that admission would weaken the grip of white supremacy in the United States. When the bill finally passed in 1959 and Asian Americans captured 42 of the 81 public offices (including U.S. Senator Hiram Fong, a Chinese American, and U.S. Representative Daniel Inouye, a Japanese American), the press saluted the event as a "melting pot election in a melting pot land." To many, the outcome denoted a watershed in American history with planetary payoffs. As the *New York Times* trumpeted, "We can now say to people of the Far East, 'Your brothers and cousins have equal rights with ourselves and are helping to make our laws.'"[38]

Although many cheered statehood as inclusive progress, the act generated its own exclusions and marginalizations. For one, it furthered assumptions about the perpetual foreignness of Asian

ethnics. Even more troubling, it rendered invisible Native Hawaiians and their problems under U.S. rule. Contemporary accounts described a modern Hawai'i displacing "old Polynesia" with its "full-blooded" natives destined to fade into the mixed-race population with only vestiges of their traditional culture to remain. Asian Americans, in contrast, stood for Hawai'i's future. By ignoring the very existence of indigenous peoples, not to mention their opposition to colonization in all forms, statehood boosters evaded an uncomfortable confrontation with the consequences of U.S. occupation. In framing admission as the only possibility for Hawai'i's future, supporters legitimated the spread of U.S. global hegemony by valorizing American democracy as unique, benevolent, and superior to alternative arrangements of power.[39]

Definitively Not-Black

Within the double crucibles of global war and domestic racial reform, a cross-section of historical actors remade Asian Americans from indelible aliens to assimilating Others in the 1940s and 1950s. As racial liberalism increasingly came under attack and the black freedom movement evolved into its more radical iterations by the mid-1960s, assimilating Others underwent a subtle yet profound metamorphosis into the model minority: the Asiatic who was at once an exemplary citizen and *definitively not-black*.

Midcentury liberals believed strongly in the ability of educational campaigns and social science to transform existing ideas about race and, in turn, alter the country's racial order. Constituents of the era's race relations complex identified Nikkei citizenship as an American dilemma to be repaired in order to prove the nation's capacity for righting its wrongs, thereby protecting the United States' global position. To this end, academicians, activists, journalists, and politicians generated a series of "recovery narratives" in the 1940s and 1950s celebrating the post-internment rebound of "California's Amazing Japanese."[40]

For liberals, the recovery narratives did valuable political work. Casting internment as a "disguised blessing" and, ironically, the Nikkei's "greatest opportunity" for assimilation, they redeemed the nation's missteps. They also reinforced the tenets of racial liberalism, especially state management of the racial order. Relatedly, the discourse emphasized that racial minorities cooperate with rather than oppose the government's handling of race relations. The stories posited Japanese Americans as models of acceptable political behavior, implicitly comparing the JACL's moderation to the more confrontational tactics of African American civil rights activists.[41]

While Japanese Americans had made great strides by the late 1950s in terms of rehabilitating their collective public image, JACL stewards did not rest easy. At that time, U.S.–Japan tensions again flared up. American businesses called for boycotts of cheap Japanese goods, while many Japanese opposed the unequal treaty terms between the two nations. JACL officials dreaded that the community would suffer a backlash as a result. Moreover, they still felt insecure about the organization's standing within Japanese America as many co-ethnics continued to disagree with the league's vision and strategies. What, they wondered, could be done to further secure the footing of Japanese in America as well vindicate the JACL itself?[42]

To address these problems, JACL redoubled its public relations efforts by launching the Japanese American Research Project (JARP) in 1960. A primary aim of JARP was to produce a popular account of Japanese American history that would glorify both the community as well as the JACL itself. To potential backers and funders, the league framed the Nikkei saga as a unique "triumph of democracy in action": despite facing extreme hardship and hostility, Japanese Americans had attained "within a single generation . . . a real measure of 'Success,' greater than many Europeans with far fewer handicaps." JACL suggested that the story could boost the country's reputation in Asia and Africa by demonstrating the possibilities for racial

minorities in the United States. Its reasoning worked. JARP not only found an institutional home at University of California, Los Angeles in 1962, but also received substantial support from the Carnegie Corporation.[43]

JACL directors shrewdly spun their version of Japanese American history to speak to the increasingly urgent "Negro Problem"—a discursive and political move that would have far-reaching consequences. Nowhere was this most apparent than in journalist Bill Hosokawa's book *Nisei: The Quiet Americans* (1969), the general history of Japanese America commissioned by the league as part of JARP. *Nisei* cast Japanese Americans as *definitively not-black* model minorities, citing famous examples (World Trade Center architect Minoru Yamasaki, Hawai'i Congresswoman Patsy Mink) and asking how such feats of assimilation had been achieved in the face of racial discrimination. "Looking on the extremes of apathy and militancy among Negroes and Hispanos, some Nisei from the comfort of their upper middle class homes have been led to ask: 'Why can't they pull themselves up by their own bootstraps the way we did?'" observed Hosokawa.[44]

Such sentiments infuriated many Nikkei, including some of JACL's own members. Discontents had petitioned publisher William Morrow and Company to reject the title *Nisei: The Quiet Americans*, taking issue with it as a "propaganda device to tell Black Americans and Mexican Americans to behave like 'good little Orientals' who know their place."[45] Yuji Ichioka, the young founder of Berkeley's radical Asian American Political Alliance, pointed out that the book ignored the "damages" of internment and racism. Furthermore, he noted, younger Japanese American activists were now questioning the very foundations of JACL's brand of racial liberalism: "What have we been integrating into? Into a nation conducting a politically and morally bankrupt war against Vietnamese people in the name of freedom and democracy? A nation bent upon exterminating militant Black leaders? A nation which is moving to the extreme right in the name of law and order? A nation in which the so-called 'American Dream' has turned out to be a violent nightmare?"[46] Like thousands of others who joined the nationwide, grassroots mobilization known as the Asian American Movement (late 1960s–1970s), Ichioka decisively refused to endorse what he saw as anti-black, imperialistic model minority ideology.

But Ichioka and his colleagues found themselves outnumbered. By the mid-1960s, the repositioning of Japanese Americans in the national racial order as laudably and decisively not-black had become racial "truth." Influential thinkers and doers followed in the footsteps of JACL. Notably, the league assisted sociologist William Petersen with his essay juxtaposing "successful" Nikkei with the nation's "problem minorities" for *New York Times Magazine*.[47] Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan appropriated the Nikkei recovery narrative to defend his controversial paper "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action." Published just days before Los Angeles' Watts Riots in August 1965, the Moynihan Report (as it came to be known) asserted that "the deterioration of the Negro family"—epitomized first and foremost by black matriarchy—was the root cause of "the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society." As a liberal, Moynihan's intent was to mobilize support for federal interventions to establish "stable" black families as a crucial means to lift them out of poverty. When the Moynihan report unleashed a torrent of controversy, its besieged author turned to Japanese Americans' "close knit family structure" to explain how Nikkei had become a "prosperous middle-class group."[48] (The percentage of white-collar Japanese Americans had increased from 24.7 percent in 1940 to 35.1 percent in 1960.)[49]

Moynihan also admired the progress made by Chinese immigrants since their arrival in the nineteenth century. "No people came to our shores poorer than the Chinese," he avowed, yet their descendants had gone on to remarkable heights of educational attainment despite continued concentration in urban centers. Harkening back to the 1950s consensus on Chinese American

non-delinquency, he pointed to the "singularly stable, cohesive, and enlightened family life"—as opposed to dysfunctional African American households—as the key to Chinese Americans' success.[50] (In 1960, Chinese American men and women had attained higher mean education levels [28 percent and 24.2 percent had some college training, respectively] than their white and black counterparts.)[51]

As Moynihan made clear, the trajectories of Japanese and Chinese American racialization converged in the mid-1960s as definitively not-black model minorities.[52] As racial liberalism came under heavy fire from both the left and the right, this novel stereotype gained purchase. Liberals invested in the assimilation and integration formula for achieving racial equality, pointing to Japanese and Chinese Americans as evidence of its effectiveness. Conservatives apprehensive about the growing force of black power and the future of white supremacy also looked to these two groups as exemplars of minority "law and order." Across the political spectrum, Americans discovered that "success stories" of Japanese and Chinese in the United States—living embodiments of advancement *in spite of* the persistent color line and *because of* their racial (or "cultural") differences—could be used as potent ammunition to defend their social, economic, and political visions.

Hawai'i Senator Daniel Inouye captured this new positioning in his keynote speech at the 1968 Democratic National Convention: "As an American whose ancestors come from Japan, I have become accustomed to a question most recently asked by a very prominent businessman who was concerned about the threat of riots and of resultant loss in life and property. 'Tell me,' he said, 'why can't the Negro be more like you?" (To his credit, Inouye dismissed the juxtaposition as unsound because Asian Americans had never endured chattel slavery or been subjected to "systematic racist deprivation" comparable to the extent of Jim Crow.)[53]

By the twilight of the civil rights era, then, the idea that Japanese and Chinese Americans were distinctly unlike African Americans had become racial commonsense.

Yet the stereotype also contained the seeds of its own critique. The model minority paradoxically served as a rallying point for the Asian American Movement and the creation of "Asian American" as an innovative, progressive racial identity. Movement participants soundly rejected the model minority myth for obscuring real problems in their communities as well as its complicity in upholding anti-black racism and U.S. imperial domination. They refused to allow themselves to be used in upholding the distinction between "good" and "bad" minorities. Instead, they embraced "Asian American" to signify self-determination and solidarity with other U.S. minorities and "Third World" peoples everywhere. The invention of *Asian America* was grounded in dreams of a different kind of nation and a different kind of world, ones grounded in freedom, dignity, and justice for all.[54]

Notes

1 "Orientals Find Bias Is Down Sharply in U.S.," *New York Times*, December 13, 1970, 1, 70.

2 William Petersen, "Success Story, Japanese-American Style," *New York Times Magazine*, January 9, 1966, 20–21, 33, 36, 38, 40–41, 43; "Success Story of One Minority Group in U.S.," *U.S. News and World Report*, December 26, 1966, 73–76. See especially the widely cited article by Keith Osajima, "Asian Americans as the Model Minority: An Analysis of the Popular Press Image in the 1960s and 1980s," in *Reflections on Shattered Windows: Promises and Prospects for Asian Americans*, Eds. Okihiro et al. (Washington State University Press, 1988), 165–174.

3 Recent historical scholarship on Asian Americans in the post-World War II decades has made important strides in this direction. We now have a much more nuanced sense of how and why Asian Americans transitioned from "yellow perils" to "model minorities" after the end of Asian Exclusion. See especially Robert G. Lee, *Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (Philadelphia, PA, 1999); Xiaojian Zhao, *Remaking Chinese America: Immigration, Family, and Community, 1940–1965* (New

Brunswick, NJ, 2002); Lon Kurashige, *Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival in Los Angeles, 1934–1990* (Berkeley, 2002); Scott Kurashige, *The Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in the Making of Multiethnic Los Angeles* (Princeton, NJ, 2008); Charlotte Brooks, *Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends: Asian Americans, Housing, and the Transformation of Urban Califomia* (Chicago, IL, 2009); Greg Robinson, *After Camp: Portraits in Midcentury Japanese American Life and Politics* (Berkeley, CA, 2012); Cindy I-Fen Cheng, *Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race During the Cold War* (New York, 2013); Ellen D. Wu, *The Color of Success: Asian Americans and the Origins of the Model Minority* (Princeton, NJ, 2014); Arissa H. Oh, *Into The Arms of America: The Korean Origins of International Adoption* (Stanford, CA, 2015); Charlotte Brooks, *Between Mao and McCarthy: Chinese American Politics in the Cold War Years* (Chicago, IL, 2015); Madeline Y. Hsu, *The Good Immigrants: How The Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority* (Princeton, NJ, 2015).

4 Recently there has been an explosion of historiography connecting mid-twentieth-century foreign policy concerns with race in the domestic arena. See for example Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY, 1997); Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ, 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley, 2003); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satcho Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); Nikhil Pal Singh, *Black Is A Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Cambridge, 2004); Kevin K. Gaines, *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006); Brooks, *Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends*; Mary Ting-Yi Lui, "Rehabilitating Chinatown at Mid-Century: Chinese Americans, Race, and U.S. Cultural Diplomacy," in *Chinatowns in a Transnational World: Myths and Realities of an Urban Phenomenon*, ed. Ruth Mayer and Vanessa Künneman (New York, 2011), 81–100; Cheng, *Citizens of Asian America*; Wu, *The Color of Success*; Oh, *Into The Arms of America*; Hsu, *The Good Immigrants*.

5 Claire Jean Kim's seminal theory of "racial triangulation" is indispensable for understanding the racialization of Asians in the United States. Kim argues that the racialization of Asian Americans has rested in large part on "civic ostracism," whereby whites have cast them as "foreign and unassimilable." But this explanation misses a key dimension of the post-World War II period. The history of the production of the model minority stereotype reveals that whites moved to assimilate ethnic Japanese and Chinese beginning in World War II *because* of their perceived foreignness.

6 Christina Klein posits the key argument that Cold War geopolitical imperatives for the United States dictated that American elites manufacture a "global imaginary of integration" as a positive counterpoint to what many perceived as a negative ideology of containment rooted in fear. The positive image stressed affective ties between the United States and peoples of the decolonizing Third World. See Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, 23-24.

7 On race making, see Michael Omi and Howard Winant's classic text *Racial Formation in the United States* (New York, 2014 edition).

8 This study resonates with two important critiques of Kim's triangulation model. Shu-mei Shih ("Comparative Racialization: An Introduction," *PMLA* 123, no. 5 (October 2008): 1347-1362) questions the assumed white-black-Asian triangulation (as opposed to other racial categories). Colleen Lye ("The Afro-Asian Analogy," *PMLA* 123, no. 5 (October 2008): 1732-1736) argues that the triangulation approach occludes interpretive possibilities by reducing Asian racialization "to a white supremacy that is by temporal and conceptual priority antiblack." Indeed, the invention of the model minority stereotype demonstrates that antiblack racism was but one of a range of factors grounding the changing racialization of Asian Americans in the mid-twentieth century.

9 On post-World War II racial liberalism, see Walter Jackson, *Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938–1997* (Chapel Hill, 1990); Gary Gerstle, "The Protean Character of American Liberalism" in *The American Historical Review* 99:4 (Oct 1994), 1043–1073; Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995); Nikhil Pal Singh, "Culture/Wars: Recoding Empire in an Age of Democracy," *American Quarterly* 50:3 (1998): 471-522; Ruth Feldstein, *Motherhood in Black and White: Race and Sex in American Liberalism, 1930–1965* (Ithaca, 2000); Gary Gerstle, *American Crucible: Race and Nation in*

the Twentieth Century (New Jersey, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Alice O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth Century U.S. History* (Princeton, 2001); Singh, *Black Is a Country;* Carol A. Horton, *Race and the Making of American Liberalism* (New York, 2005); Thomas J. Sugrue, *Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Civil Rights Struggle in the North* (New York, 2008); Daniel Martinez Hosang, *Racial Propositions: Ballot Initiatives and the Making of Postwar California* (Berkeley, 2010); Mark Brilliant, *The Color of America Has Changed: How Racial Diversity Shaped Civil Rights Reform in California, 1941-1978* (New York, 2010).

10 On the history of internment see Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II* (New York, 1972); Michi Nishiura Weglyn, *Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps* (New York, 1976); U.S. Commission on Wartime Evacuation and Relocation of Civilians, *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians: Report for the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs* (Washington, D.C., 1983; reprint, Seattle, 1997); Greg Robinson, *A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America* (New York, 2009).

11 Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ,* 2004), 175-177; Colleen Lye, *America's Asia: Racial Form and American Literature, 1893-1945* (Princeton, NJ, 2005), 7.

12 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 12-13, 19-28.

13 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 13, 28-33; Charlotte Brooks, "In the Twilight Zone Between Black and White: Japanese American Resettlement and Community in Chicago, 1942-1945," *Journal of American History,* 86 (March 2000): 1655-1687.

14 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 28-34; War Relocation Authority, "When You Leave The Relocation Center," n/d, densho.org.

15 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 33-42.

16 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 80.

17 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 78-86; Blake Clark and Oland D. Russell, "Hail Our Japanese-American GIs!" *Reader's Digest,* July 1945, 65-67.

18 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 86-88.

19 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 88-91.

20 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 92-98.

21 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 81-82, 90-91, 95-96.

22 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 98-100.

23 Bradford Smith to Alan Cranston, June 20, 1942, Folder: Chinese Exclusion Acts, Box 1075, Entry E222, NC-148, Record Group 208, United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.

24 Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion, "Our Chinese Wall," 1943, Box 1, Carl Glick Papers, University of Iowa Libraries Special Collections, Iowa City.

25 Carey McWilliams, *Brothers Under the Skin* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1943) 108, 112; Rose Hum Lee, "Chinese in The United States Today: The War Has Changed Their Lives," *Survey Graphic: Magazine of Social Interpretation,* October 1942, 419, 444.

26 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 114.

27 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 114-122.

28 On the 1956 mass subpoena, see Zhao, *Remaking Chinese America,* 152-184; Him Mark Lai, *Becoming Chinese American: A History of Communities and Institutions* (Walnut Creek, CA, 2004), 19-35; Ngai, *Impossible Subjects,* 202-224.

29 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 112. On the US and "Overseas Chinese," see also Meredith Leigh Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 2015); Cheng, *Citizens of Asian America;* Brooks, *Between Mao and McCarthy.*

30 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 122-138.

31 Wu, *The Color of Success,* 122-138.

32 William McIntyre, "Chinatown Offers Us a Lesson," *New York Times Magazine,* October 6, 1957, 49, 51, 54, 56, 59; "Americans Without a Delinquency Problem," *Look,* April 29, 1958, 75-81; "Why Chinese Kids Don't Go Bad," 84th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 101, (August 2, 1955), A5668-A5672 (originally cited in Betty Lee Sung, *Mountain of Gold* (New York, 1967); Albert Q. Maisel, "The Chinese Among Us," *Reader's Digest,* February 1959, 203-204, 206, 208-210, 212.

33 Wu, *The Color of Success*, 211-214.
34 Wu, *The Color of Success*, 214-219.
35 Ann K. Ziker, "Segregationists Confront American Empire: The Conservative White South and the Question of Hawaiian Statehood, 1947-1959," *Pacific Historical Review* 76, no. 3 (2007): 439-465; Wu, The *Color of Success*, 219-220.
36 Gretchen Heefner, "'A Symbol of the New Frontier': Hawaiian Statehood, Anti-Colonialism, and Winning the Cold War," *Pacific Historical Review* 74, no. 4 (2005): 545-574; Wu, *The Color of Success*, 220-223; John A. Burns, "Asia and the Future," letter to the editor, *Commonweal*, August 9, 1957, 474-475.
37 Wu, *The Color of Success*, 223-228.
38 Wu, *The Color of Success*, 230-231; "The State of Hawaii Votes," *New York Times*, July 31, 1959, 22.
39 Gene Sherman, "Hawaii's New Horizons: Isles Melting Pot of the Pacific," *Los Angeles Times*, May 21, 1963, 2; William J. Lederer, "The 50th State, at 5, 'Goes Mainland,'" *New York Times Magazine*, April 16, 1964, SM24; Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, 1-17; Dean Itsuji Saranillio, "Colliding Histories: Hawai'i Statehood at the Intersection of Asians 'Ineligible to Citizenship' and Hawaiians 'Unfit for Self-Government,'" *Journal of Asian American Studies* (2010): 283-309.
40 Wu, *The Color of Success*, 156-162; Demarre Bess, "California's Amazing Japanese," *Saturday Evening Post*, April 30, 1955, 38-39, 68, 72, 76, 80, 83.
41 Wu, *The Color of Success*, 156-162.
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43 T. Scott Miyakawa, "A Proposal for A Definitive History of the Japanese In The United States, 1860-1960: The Preliminary Outline For Discussion and Review," October 1961, UCLA Young Research Library; Wu, *The Color of Success*, 150-152, 162-165.
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47 JACL, Official Convention Minutes, 1966, 50, Folder 3, Box 297, Japanese American Research Project, Young Research Library Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles.
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53 "Transcript of the Keynote Address by Senator Inouye Decrying Violent Protests," *New York Times*, August 27, 1968, 28.
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